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I.  INTRODUCTION 
During the last three decades, scientists have made tremendous advancements in 
the field of biotechnology.1  The advent of genetic engineering2 and recombinant 
                                                                
1Generally, biotechnology is the manipulation of biological materials and processes.  
SUSAN ALDRIDGE, THE THREAD OF LIFE 183 (1996).  For the purposes of this paper, the term 
biotechnology refers to the products and processes of isolating, preparing, and replicating 
fragments of deoxyribonucleic acid (hereinafter DNA) and ribonucleic acid (hereinafter 
RNA), and using DNA and RNA fragments to produce proteins.  John M. Golden, 
Biotechnology, Technology Policy, and Patentability: Natural Products and Invention in the 
American System, 50 EMORY L.J. 101, 113-14 (2001). 
2Genetic engineering is just one form of biotechnology.  Genetic engineering allows for 
the transfer of genes from one species into another.  A gene is cut out of one organism, placed 
in a vector, and the vector carries the cut gene into a host organism where the gene will be 
cloned as the host organism replicates resulting in many copies of the cut gene and its 
corresponding product.  ALDRIDGE, supra note 1, at 103-11. 
1Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2002
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DNA techniques3 in the 1970’s was responsible for much of this progress.  
Biotechnology has opened up the possibility of new treatments for cancer, heart 
disease, and other genetically based diseases.4  Patients' genetic information has 
become part of their regular healthcare treatment.  As genetic information becomes 
more readily available, it will become a vital resource in the treatment of patients.  
Doctors can use genetic information to detect patients’ risks of developing certain 
diseases and prescribe preventative measures, identify disease carriers through 
carrier screening, and treat diseases with pharmacogenomics, gene therapy, and 
gene-based therapy.5  Not only does the biotechnology industry have the potential to 
dramatically increase doctors’ ability to diagnose and cure many of the terrible 
diseases that afflict millions in this country, it also promises to be very profitable.6  
In 1999 alone, the biotechnology industry generated $20 billion in revenue.7 
Increasing evidence suggests that the biotechnology industry’s interest in 
generating revenue and the public’s desire to obtain the best healthcare may be at 
odds.8  The patenting of genetic information is at the core of this debate.  Most, if not 
all, of the products of the biotech industry’s research are patentable.  Historically, 
patents have been justified on the grounds that they are needed to create an incentive 
for researchers and companies to invest time and money in projects that have 
uncertain outcomes.  In the biotechnology arena, patents do not simply encourage 
innovation and allow innovators to recoup their costs.  Patents can also limit the 
public’s access to valuable information that could benefit individuals and society.  
This Note argues that current patent laws are not socially beneficial when applied to 
biotechnology products. 
The ultimate goal of patent law is to strike a balance between providing rewards 
for invention, spurring new innovation, and ensuring the availability of the 
innovations to the public.9  This balance is necessary and desirable because there is 
always more than one stakeholder in a new technology or invention, particularly in 
                                                                
3
“The term recombinant DNA literally means the joining or recombining of two pieces of 
DNA from two different species.”  Who Owns Life? Biotech Primer, THE AMERICAN JOURNAL 
OF BIOETHICS ONLINE, at http://www.ajobonline.com (last visited Feb. 17, 2003) [hereinafter 
Biotech Primer].  
4Genetics: The Future of Medicine, NIH Publication No. 00-4873, at 9, available at 
http://www.genome.gov/Pages/EducationKit/brochure.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2003) 
[hereinafter Genetics: The Future of Medicine].  See Vida Foubister, Gene Patents Raise 
Concerns for Researchers, Clinicians, AMERICAN MEDICAL NEWS, Feb. 21, 2000, available at 
http://www.ama-assn.org/sci-pubs/amnews/pick_00/prsb0221.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2003). 
5Genetics: The Future of Medicine, supra note 4, at 8-11.  This publication provides 
definitions and functions of all these treatment options. 
6Margaret Graham Tebo, The Big Gene Profit Machine, A.B.A. J., Apr. 2001, at 46. 
7The Economic Contributions of the Biotechnology Industry to the U.S. Economy, Ernst & 
Young Economics Consulting and Quantitative Analysis, May 2000, at 4.  
8Raphael Lewis & Jamal E. Watson, Biotech Protest Draws 2,500, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 
27, 2000, at B1. 
9Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 533-535 (1966).  See Golden, supra note 1, at 104-07.  
See also Clarisa Long, Patents and Cumulative Information, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y. 229, 
229 (2000). 
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol50/iss2/6
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the case of DNA patents.10  The stakeholders include the private biotechnology and 
pharmaceutical firms, the scientists and researchers, the federal government, the 
insurance industry, and the public.  Each stakeholder has a unique interest.  This 
Note will focus on the interest of the inventors, who will become the patent holders, 
and the public.  The public’s interest lies in having access to the best healthcare at a 
reasonable cost.  This interest often conflicts with that of the inventor patent holder 
when the patent holder can use the patent to garner excessive profits thus limiting 
access. 
This Note demonstrates that the balance among the various interests of these 
particular stakeholders is not being met.  The next section of this Note provides a 
background on the patentability of DNA.  Part III surveys and explain the recent 
flood of gene patents into the Patent and Trademark Office (hereinafter PTO).  Part 
IV discusses the public interest in human gene patents.  Part V demonstrates that the 
patenting of human DNA presents unique problems that do not arise in the patenting 
of other inventions.  Finally, Part VI discusses an approach to balance these interests 
and the need for congressional action to achieve a balance between encouraging 
innovation and providing the most socially beneficial health outcomes.   
II.  THE PATENTABILITY OF DNA 
It is undisputed that DNA (including genes, gene fragments, and their 
corresponding products) can be patented.11  This section of the Note briefly reviews 
the history of DNA-related patents. 
Congressional patent power derives from Article 1, section 8, clause 8 of the 
United States Constitution.  This clause reads: “[t]he Congress shall have 
power…[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited 
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.”12  Based upon this power, Congress enacted the Patent Act.13  The 
Patent Act provides that “[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful 
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefore, subject to the conditions and 
requirements of this title.”14  The requirements of the title include that the invention 
                                                                
10In this Note, the terms “human DNA patents,” “human gene patents” or “gene patents” 
will be used interchangeably.  “Gene patent is a broad term that refers to the patenting of 
either a process that involves the isolation of DNA (where DNA refers to either DNA or 
associated materials such as RNA) as well as to a chemical substance related to DNA.”  Gene 
Patenting, AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub 
/category/2314.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2003) [hereinafter Gene Patenting].   
11The PTO has issued 6,000 gene-related patents.  There are 20,000 applications related to 
genes currently pending before the PTO.  Julie Grisham, New Rules For Gene Patents, 
NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY, Sept., 2000, Vol. 18, No. 9, at 921.  See also Amgen, Inc. v. 
Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
12U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
1335 U.S.C. §§ 100-376 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  See Donna M. Gitter, International 
Conflicts Over Patenting Human DNA Sequences in the United States and the European 
Union: An Argument For Compulsory Licensing and a Fair-Use Exemption, 76 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1623, 1637 (2001). 
1435 U.S.C. § 101 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2002
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be statutory patentable subject matter,15 that the patent application include a written 
description referred to as the enablement requirement,16 and that the invention be 
novel,17 non-obvious,18 and useful.19  This patentability analysis is used for all 
inventions.20  
Genes are considered patentable subject matter.21  When genes have been isolated 
and purified22 they are considered a composition of matter that is covered by the 
Patent Act.23  However, the Patent Act “does not cover the gene as it occurs in 
nature.”24  In other words, an isolated and purified gene or segment of DNA is 
considered a new composition of matter.25  In this way, patent law does not treat 
DNA differently from other chemical compounds that are compositions of matter 
because it does not occur naturally in this form.26 
Applicants for gene patents can meet the enablement provision by giving a 
written description of the invention that would enable the invention to be made and 
used by someone with “ordinary skill in the art.”27  The requirement that the 
invention be novel simply means that it must not have been done before in exactly 
the same way.28  In addition, the form of the DNA cannot have been described in a 
previous patent or patent application.29  The non-obviousness element requires that 
the invention not be obvious to an ordinary person skilled in the art of the invention’s 
                                                                
15Id. 
1635 U.S.C. § 112 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
1735 U.S.C. § 102 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
1835 U.S.C. § 103 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
1935 U.S.C. § 101 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
20John J. Doll, Biotechnology: The Patenting of DNA, SCIENCE, May 1, 1998, Vol. 280, 
No. 5364, at 689. 
21Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1093 (January 5, 2001). 
22Isolation and purification of DNA refers to the process by which a gene is isolated from 
its natural state and processed through purifying steps that separate the gene from other 
molecules it is naturally associated with.  Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. at 
1093.    
23Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. at 1093. 
24Id.  Explaining that concerns about humans infringing on patents because their body 
contains the patented gene are unfounded. 
2535 U.S.C. § 101.  See Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. at 1093.  
26Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. at 1095.  
2735 U.S.C. § 112 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  John J. Doll, Talking Gene Patents, Scientific 
American, Aug. 2001, available at http://www.sciam.com (last visited Feb. 17, 2003). 
2835 U.S.C. § 102 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  Doll, supra note 27, at http://www.sciam.com. 
29Id. 
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol50/iss2/6
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particular field.30  Gene patents meet the non-obvious requirement if they have not 
been described as a composition of matter prior to the patent application.31  
The PTO has recently changed the utility requirement for gene patents.  In 
January 2001, the PTO established new patent utility guidelines32 that primarily 
address utility standards for gene and gene fragment patents.33  The new guidelines 
came in response to criticisms that too many gene patents were being issued.  
Although the new guidelines uphold the general concept that genes can be patented, 
they raise the utility bar.34  There are two tests under the 2001 guidelines; however, 
only one test has to be satisfied in order to meet the utility requirement.35   
The first test is the Specific, Substantial, and Credible Utility Test. This test 
states that a utility is “specific” when it is particular to the subject matter claimed.36  
“Substantial utility” requires a “real world” use, which means that the immediate 
benefit must be identified and not need more research.37  Lastly, a “credible” utility is 
determined by whether a person with ordinary skill in the art would accept that the 
invention “is currently available for such use.”38  The second test is the Well-
Established Utility Test.  This test incorporates the Specific, Substantial and Credible 
Utility test, but allows applicants to meet the requirements by demonstrating that the 
function of the gene or its protein is connected to a gene or protein that has been 
identified and is well known.39  This new utility standard significantly eliminates 
applications where the only claimed utility is that the invention can be used for 
further study of its own utility.40 
Historically, the PTO generally rejected patent applications involving living 
organisms.41  This trend ended in 1980, when the Supreme Court reversed a PTO 
rejection of a patent application for a genetically modified bacteria.42  In Diamond v. 
                                                                
3035 U.S.C. § 103 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  Doll, supra note 27, at http://www.sciam.com. 
31Warren Kaplan, Biotech Patenting 101, available at http://www.gene-
watch.org/genewatch/articles/14-3patenting.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2003). 
32Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. at 1093. 
33The Fate of Gene Patents Under the New Utility Guidelines, 2001 DUKE L. & TECH REV. 
0008, ¶ 1 (Feb. 28, 2001), available at http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/2001dltr 
0008.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2003) [hereinafter The Fate of Gene Patents]. 
34Id. at ¶ 3. 
35Id. at ¶ 10-11. 
36Id. 
37Id.  “This rule derives from the US Supreme Court’s position in Brenner that a chemical 
or a chemical process is not sufficiently useful if its only use is as an object of scientific 
research.”  Id. at ¶ 13 discussing Brenner, 353 U.S. at 535. 
38The Fate of Gene Patents, supra note 33 at ¶ 14. 
39Id. at ¶ 15-17. 
40Id. at ¶ 25. 
41JEREMY RIFKIN, THE BIOTECH CENTURY: HARNESSING THE GENE AND REMAKING THE 
WORLD 42 (1998). 
42Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
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Chakrabarty,43 the Supreme Court found that the bacterium was a “nonnaturally 
occurring manufacture or composition of matter — a product of human ingenuity”44 
and was covered by the Patent Act.45  In rendering the decision, the Supreme Court 
did “not distinguish between ‘living and inanimate things…’ but [] distinguish[ed] 
between ‘products of nature, whether living or not, and human-made inventions.’”46  
The Court emphasized that Congress intended patents to cover broad subject matters 
“includ[ing] anything under the sun that is made by man.”47  Many believe that the 
decision in Chakrabarty, although it did not address human DNA patents 
specifically, expanded the scope of patentable biotech subject matter.48  The 
Chakrabarty decision then gave rise to Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co.,49 
where the federal circuit relied on the “human ingenuity” standard from Chakrabarty 
to uphold the patenting of DNA sequences.50   
When issuing human DNA patents, the PTO has granted three basic types: 
structure patents, function patents, and process patents.51  Structure patents cover the 
isolated and purified molecule as a new composition of matter.52  Function patents 
are issued when the applicant has invented a use for the DNA, such as a diagnostic 
test.53  Process patents typically are given when an applicant has found a new method 
of isolating, purifying, analyzing, modifying, or synthesizing the DNA.54  Human 
DNA patents usually fall under a composition of matter (structure) patents or process 
patents.55 
The Patent and Trademark Office has stated,  
[P]atents do not confer ownership of genes, genetic information, or 
sequences. The patent system promotes progress by securing a complete 
disclosure of an invention to the public, in exchange for the inventor’s 
                                                                
43Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309. 
44Id. 
45Id. 
46Kaplan, supra note 31, at http://www.gene-watch.org/genewatch/articles/14-
3patenting.html (quoting Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 313). 
47Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309. 
48Kaplan, supra note 31, at http://www.gene-watch.org/genewatch/articles/14-
3patenting.html.  
49927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
50Id. at 1218. 
51David B. Resnik, DNA Patents and Human Dignity, 29 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 152, 153-54 
(2001). 
52Id.  
53Id. at 154. 
54Id.  
55Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. at 1095.  See Doll, supra note 20, at 689. 
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legal right to exclude other people from making, using, offering for sale, 
selling, or importing the composition for a limited time.56 
III.  THE PREVALENCE OF HUMAN GENE PATENTS 
According to several sources, the PTO has issued approximately 6,000 gene 
related patents in the United States.57  Of these 6,000 patents, more than 1,000 of 
them are related to human genes and human gene variations.58  The PTO also has 
approximately 20,000 pending gene-related applications.59  The sequencing of the 
human genome,60 advances made in genetic engineering, the creation of the Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit,61 and the cooperation between the academic world 
and the biotech industry62 have all spurred the development of the biotech industry.  
This, in turn, has led to a dramatic increase in the number of applications for, and 
grants of, gene patents.63 
The Human Genome Project (hereinafter HGP) began in 1990.64  The goal of the 
HGP was to sequence the entire human genome.65  The HGP was an international 
collaboration spearheaded by the National Institute of Health (hereinafter NIH).66  
HGP was publicly funded and made the information it obtained available to the 
public.67  At the same time that the HGP was sequencing the human genome, so was 
a private corporation, Celera Genomics Group (hereinafter Celera).  On June 26, 
2000, HGP and Celera simultaneously announced that both had completed an entire 
                                                                
56Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. at 1093-1094. 
57Grisham, supra note 11, at 921.  Andrew Pollack, U.S. Hopes to Stem Rush Toward 
Patenting Genes, THE PATRIOT LEDGER (Quincy, Mass.), June 28, 2002, at 18.  See Gitter, 
supra note 13, at 1624.  This gene patent estimation differs than the one give by John J. Doll, 
director of biotechnology for the PTO.  When asked about the number of genes patented and 
applications pending, John J. Doll stated, “[t]he only number that I have is a guesstimate: since 
1980 we have granted more that 20,000 patents on genes or other gene-related molecules [for 
humans and other organisms].  And we also know that we have more than 25,000 applications 
outstanding that actually claim genes or related molecules.”  Doll, supra note 27, at 
http://www.sciam.com. 
58Grisham, supra note 11, at 921.  
59Id. 
60J. Craig Vetner et al., The Sequence of the Human Genome, SCIENCE, Feb. 16, 2001, 
Volume 291, at 1304.  
61The Federal Courts Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 97-164 (1982). 
62Golden, supra note 1, at 101-91 (discussing the interaction between private 
biotechnology firms, the federal government, and the academic world). 
63Grisham, supra note 11, at 921.  Pollack, supra note 57, at 18. 
64Genetics: The Future of Medicine, supra note 4, at 1. 
65The Human Genome Project: New Tools for Tomorrow’s Health Research, NIH 
Publication No. 32-3190 (September 1992) at 9-11. 
66Id. at 13. 
67Genetics: The Future of Medicine, supra note 4, at 1. 
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working draft of the human genome.68  In February 2001, both groups published the 
human genome sequence in Science.69  This was nearly two years ahead of 
schedule.70  This early completion was the result of changes in the way genes were 
found and DNA was sequenced.71   
The research done by HGP has contributed greatly to the growth of gene patents 
because it allowed researchers to have use of the HGP sequences.  Researchers then 
matched the HGP sequences to known homologous sequences in other organisms.72  
The known function of the homologous sequence is then used to obtain a patent on 
the human gene.73  This research accelerated the process of identifying genes 
tremendously and led to an increase in patent applications.74  Before this type of 
high-speed gene sequencing and other techniques were developed, scientists would 
study a protein, discover its function, and work backwards to isolate the gene.75  It 
took years to isolate one gene.76  The new methods “are allowing genes or fragments 
of genes to be discovered en mass, without knowing the functions of the proteins 
produced by the genes.”77 
The increasing number of patents issued is also due, in part, to the formation of 
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.78  The Federal Courts Improvement Act 
of 1982 gave this court exclusive jurisdiction over all appeals of patent cases 
originally heard in the federal district courts.79  This led to uniformity in the law and 
allowed for easier issuance of patents.80 
New trends in patents are the privatization of biomedical research and more 
vigorous patent enforcement.81  Historically, medical and academic communities 
shared scientific information related to healthcare believing that this was the best 
                                                                
68Nicholas Wade, Genetic Code of Human Life Is Cracked by Scientists: A Shared 
Success, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2000 at A1.  
69Vetner, supra note 60, at 1304. 
70Genetics: The Future of Medicine, supra note 4, at 1. 
71Id. at 1, 3. 
72Gene Patenting, supra note 10, at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/ 
2314.html. 
73Id. 
74Id. 
75Pollack, supra note 57, at 18. 
76Id. 
77Id. 
78The Federal Courts Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 97-164 (1982). 
79Id.  Golden, supra note 1, at 125. 
80Golden, supra note 1, at 125. 
81Foubister, supra note 4, at http://www.ama-assn.org/sci-pubs/amnews/pick_00/prsb 
0221.htm.  
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way to promote progress and benefit public healthcare.82  The federal government 
sponsored basic research that took place primarily in universities and other public 
institutions such as the NIH.83  This model of publicly funded research enabled 
scientists to have immediate access to newly developed technologies and the most 
recent research discoveries in the field of biomedical research.84  In essence, 
biomedical research occurred in the public and stayed in the public domain.   
The academic environment that spurred the wealth of public information changed 
in 1980 when Congress passed the Bayh-Dole Act and the Wydler-Stevenson Act.85  
Congress passed the acts to promote commercial development of basic 
biotechnological research.86  Bayh-Dole permitted and encouraged universities and 
other institutions to patent their federally funded research and to transfer their 
technology to the private sector.87  Stevenson-Wydler mandated that federal 
laboratories actively engage in cooperative research with other laboratories including 
those in private industry, and requires the federal laboratories to set aside a portion of 
their budgets for technology transfer activities.88  The goal of the Acts is to increase 
the number of commercialized products that could be derived from the federally 
funded basic research and keep American inventions under American control.89 
IV.  THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN HUMAN GENE PATENTS  
A.  The Source  
One of the fundamental differences between human gene patents and patents on 
other scientific and medical innovations is that the source of raw material for the 
gene patents is human tissue.90  This is especially significant when researchers are 
                                                                
82Gene Patents Detrimental to Care, Training, Research, CAP Advocacy, at 
http://www.cap.org/html/advocacy/issues/genetalk.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2003).  
83Kristen Philipkoski, New Quest: Mapping Gene Patents, March 6, 2001 at 
http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,42214,00.html.  “[] 71.6% of citations to research 
papers in biotechnology patents are to publicly funded research….”  Golden, supra note 1, at 
117.  Twenty-five percent of genomics companies report that their product streams would 
have been blocked if it were not for academic research.   
84Foubister, supra note 4, at http://www.ama-assn.org/sci-pubs/amnews/pick_00/prs 
b0221.htm. 
85The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517; The Stevenson-Wydler Technology 
Innovation Agreement of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-480.  
86Id. 
87Michael A. Heller and Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The 
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE, 698, 698 (1998). 
88The Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-480.  
Technology transfer is the formal transferring of scientific research discoveries and innovation 
that occurred in the universities or federal laboratories to the commercial sector. 
89Golden, supra note 1, at 120. 
90Sara Dastgheib-Vinarov, A Higher Non-Obviousness Standard for Gene Patents: 
Protecting Biomedical Research From the Big Chill, 4 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 143, 143 
(2000). 
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looking at disease-related genes.  Oftentimes, patients who are battling a devastating 
genetic illness are the ones who contribute the genetic material that later becomes 
patented.91   
Some of these patients consent to provide the samples while others do not.92  In 
either case, the samples help generate enormous profits for those who patent human 
genes.93  Some ethicists, activists, and advocacy groups contend that patents should 
not be given at all for human tissue.94  These groups are concerned that corporations 
are selling innovations, that contain individual patient’s cellular material, to the 
public and maybe even to the patients themselves.95  Thus, the important public 
investment in the products, and technological innovations developed using human 
tissue, are very powerful public interests. 
B.  Life-Saving Innovation 
Gene patents, like other health-related patents, are a matter of heightened public 
interest because the health of the public is at stake.  The controversies surrounding 
gene patents are not simply debates about legal or scientific policy.  Rather, gene 
patenting is a vital public policy issue that needs to be addressed.96 
Scientists estimate that over 4,000 diseases stem from mutated genes.97  
Approximately 1,800 individual genes have been linked to a specific disease as of 
April 2000.98  Genes hold the necessary information for the development of 
therapies, drugs, and diagnostic tests that can provide life-saving information and 
innovation.99  Human gene patent innovation can be a matter of life or death or, at a 
minimum, about improving the quality of life for individuals with genetic diseases.100  
Because of this distinction, human gene patents contrast dramatically with typical 
patents for products like flat-screen TVs.   
                                                                
91Peter Gorner, Parents Suing Over Patenting of Genetic Test They Say the Researchers 
They Assisted are Trying to Profit From a Test for a Rare Disease, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 19, 2000, 
at 1, available at 2000 WL 3735425 (describing a suit by parents who provided researchers 
with tissue samples of their son and daughter while they were alive and pieces of their brains 
when they died). 
92Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 793 P.2d 479, cert. denied, 499 U.S. 936 
(1991).  The plaintiff’s blood was used to create a cell line that was patented by a physician 
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watch.org/programs/patents.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2003). 
95Id. 
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available at 2000 WL 11628629.  
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C.  The Public Investment 
The American public has paid for much of the pioneering research and 
development that has allowed for the enormous progress made in the area of 
biotechnology.101  Although the HGP made a huge contribution to the biotechnology 
industry,102 it cost the public $3 billion.103  In 2001 alone, the government gave the 
NIH and eight other Health and Human Service agencies $1.2 billion dollars to 
support public health, health services, and health policy research.104  The government 
also indirectly funds private biotechnology research through tax relief, tax credits 
and patent protection.105  While the private biotechnology and pharmaceutical 
industries are largely responsible for turning basic research into a commercial end 
product, it is the publicly funded initial research that allows the industry to move 
forward.106  This initial investment gives the public a stake in patents on human DNA 
that is not present with patents on other inventions.   
D.  Downstream v. Upstream Research 
Human gene patents often protect the gene, the protein product of the gene, and 
the gene fragments that are contained within the gene.107  This kind of information is 
considered basic research and provides the data that is necessary for making end 
products such as drugs, diagnostic tests, and other treatments based on genes and 
their products.108   
The gene comprises the building blocks of life and, if mutated, can cause 
devastating diseases.109  When scientists who study the affect of genes excise DNA 
from human blood or tissue, their aim is to make an exact replica of what exists in 
the body.  The researcher’s goal is to have the gene function (or fail to function as 
may be the case with a mutation) exactly as it does in the human body.  The 
researchers do not want to modify or enhance the gene at this point.  The gene itself 
is basic to the development of further research (i.e., by understanding how the gene 
functions in its unaltered state, scientists have the foundation for studying how 
various interventions alter the expression of the gene.)  If predictions are correct and 
it is possible to cure many diseases by correcting the mutated genes or by using gene 
products as drug therapies, it is necessary to do as much research as possible into the 
functioning of genes.110  Under current patent law, inventors can own the rights to 
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genes, the proteins they produce, and their gene fragments, thereby preventing or 
making it costly for other scientists to study the genes and perhaps discover valuable 
medical or therapeutic uses for the genes.111  When this happens, medical progress is 
inhibited.  In this way, genes are being treated as products in and of themselves 
instead of guides to future product discovery.  Some compare gene patenting to 
“trying to gain ownership of the alphabet, rather than of a novel or play.”112 
When basic research of this kind is patented so far upstream, it covers inventions 
upon which breakthrough research and end products could be built.113  As one author 
put it, “[o]ne firm’s research tool may be another firm’s end product.”114  If the 
licensing and transaction costs are too high, these valuable downstream innovations 
will never take place.115  Arguably, patent holders will use their proprietary 
information to engage in further innovation; however, “[n]ot all patentees who obtain 
patents on basic research results will have the capacity or interest in conducting 
further research to turn their patented inventions into commercial end-products.”116  
This causes a dual problem.  The upstream patent holders are not able to or are not 
interested in making commercially relevant end products with the gene patents they 
hold,117 but in an effort to make money, they charge licensing fees or make exclusive 
licensing arrangements that limit the amount of research that can be done on a 
particular gene.118  As Clarisa Long has stated: 
Patents have been a great source of concern for academic and basic 
researchers who fear that proprietary rights to basic research results will 
hamper the progress of science, stifle the free flow of new knowledge and 
the dissemination of research results, and chill the research efforts of 
scientists who fear infringement liability. 119  
Quite simply, patents limit the availability and raise the cost of the therapeutic and 
diagnostic end products because the patents are owned too far upstream in the 
research and development process.  This is a great concern because human genes 
have both basic and applied uses.120  Unquestionably patents are critical to 
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innovation, however, the point at which genes and genetic information should be 
subject to patents is debatable.  The stage in which patents are issued can affect the 
ability to make affordable end products.  Strong protection too early in the process 
has the potential to retard further development, yet at the same time it rewards basic 
research inventors121 and gives them an incentive to take on risky and expensive 
research.122  If there are fewer useful products for the public, the balance between 
rewarding innovation and getting that innovation to the public will not occur. 
E.  “The Tragedy of the Anticommons” 
Gene patents can be very broad.123 In Brenner v. Manson,124 the Supreme Court  
recognized the danger of issuing patents with broad applications, especially in areas 
that are “vast, unknown, and perhaps unknowable.”125  The area of genes qualifies as 
vast, unknown, and perhaps unknowable, and there is the danger that gene patents 
could “confer power to block off whole areas of scientific development, without [a] 
compensating benefit to the public.”126   
When a human gene patent holder receives a patent, it covers any commercial 
use of the gene and the gene product.127  The patent holder only has to describe one 
function of the gene or its protein product, and if any future uses or functions are 
developed with the gene, the patent still covers those uses.128  Gene patents typically 
do meet utility requirements but their uses may not be optimal.  These broad patents 
cause a problem that Heller and Eisenberg two well known authors in this area, refer 
to as the “tragedy of the anticommons” for biomedical research.129    
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When people hold a resource in common they tend to overuse it because they 
lack any incentive to conserve the resource.  This overuse is referred to as a “tragedy 
of the commons.”130  Privatization131 is often used to solve this problem, but when a 
scarce resource is over-privatized the result can be a “tragedy of the 
anticommons.”132  The “tragedy of the anticommons” results in the underuse of a 
resource because too many people are excluded from using the resource.133 
Underuse is occurring with human gene patents.  Once a gene or gene fragment is 
patented, any further research using the patented materials must go through the 
patent holder.134  These patents are so far upstream and so broad in their scope that 
they stifle future research.135  This problem is especially pervasive as it applies to the 
patenting of human genes because the information and research needed to produce 
an end product is cumulative.136  Oftentimes, more than one gene, gene fragment, or 
gene product is needed to make a final product such as a genetic diagnostic test or 
therapeutic proteins.137  Recent genetic research has shown the idea that a single gene 
being responsible for a disease is the exception, not the rule.138  Instead, most 
diseases are polygenic, meaning that multiple genes are involved in the manifestation 
of a disease.139  If a patent exists for each of the several pieces of genetic material 
needed to develop a product, the cost and time of developing the end product may be 
prohibitive.140  
One of the purposes of giving patents is to motivate inventors to design around 
the current patented invention.141  The “design around” concept leads to competition 
and progress that betters the public.142  However, genes cannot be “designed around” 
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because no substitute exists for them.143  If researchers want to work on a cure for a 
genetically-based disease, they must use the gene that causes the disease.  Patents 
can prevent these scientists from gaining access to unique and valuable genetic 
information. 
V.  THE IMPACTS OF GENE PATENTS ON THE PROVISION OF HEALTHCARE 
A.  The Increased Cost 
Gene patents have the potential to make healthcare more expensive and therefore, 
out of reach for many Americans.  Individual testing for predisposition to genetic 
diseases can be extremely expensive.144  For example, the Chicago Tribune reported 
that Missouri Medicaid will pay eleven dollars toward a test that screens for Downs 
Syndrome.145  The patent holders want to collect nine dollars for each test 
performed.146  This leaves the healthcare provider with two dollars to cover the costs 
of administering the test and interpreting the results.  One doctor stated that he will 
be forced to stop offering the test or have to ask patients to pay the difference 
between the two dollars he has left and the actual cost of performing the test.147  
Gene patents create a monopoly and under current licensing practices many patients 
could not afford to have “access to new genetic information about themselves, their 
children, and their future children.”148  It might not seem like much to ask a patient 
for ten to twenty-five dollars to cover one test, but when you consider the high 
number of tests that would be needed for a complete genetic screening, the cost 
skyrockets.149  
There is concern in the medical field “that genetic testing of patients could 
become prohibitively expensive if each gene is patented.”150  Currently, researchers 
are working on “chips” that could screen for 200-300 genetic diseases at a time, but 
if each gene is patented and each patent holder charges a royalty fee, this screening 
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device will be very costly.  As stated earlier, it is thought that over 4,000 diseases 
stem from mutated genes, and thus far, 1,792 individual genes have been linked to a 
disease.151  Tests for individual genetic diseases tend not to be cost prohibitive; 
however, the cost of multiple tests could become so expensive that most individuals 
could not afford to be tested.152 
Gene patents not only raise the price of screening tests for diseases like Downs 
Syndrome, but also increase the cost of drugs that are made with gene products.  12-
14% of the cost of a drug is due to the royalties that have to be paid to patent 
holders.153  As Jeffrey Kahn, the director of the Center for Bioethics at the University 
of Minnesota, has said, gene patenting “has the potential to create the haves and 
have-nots in terms of genetic information about health.”154 
Those in favor of broad patents argue that part of the reward and incentive to 
make their products is the ability to make a profit and recoup the costs of research.  
However, patents on the human gene are a unique situation.  As I discussed 
previously, the public has funded much of the research.155  For example, many of the 
genes and the gene products that are currently being patented are the result of the 
publicly funded $3 billion Human Genome Project.156  In effect, the public pays 
twice, first by funding the research and then, because of the monopoly the gene 
patentee holds, by having to pay for the end products.   
1.  Monopoly Power 
The granting of patents creates legalized monopolies designed to encourage 
innovation.  In the case of genes, the creation of such monopolies is having an 
undesirable and contradictory effect.157  The broad monopolies are financial 
disincentives for others to try and improve and expand their genetic research.  
Patents prevent others from engaging in cutting edge research and impede 
competition that could drive down healthcare costs.158  These monopolies appear 
even more dangerous when one considers that “four private companies could own 
half of the human genome.”159  The human genome project revealed the true size of 
the human genome, which was much smaller than scientists anticipated, therefore, 
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corporations own a higher percentage of the human genome than expected.160  Some 
examples may serve as a tool to explain the impact of gene patents. 
a.  Example: Myriad Genetics Inc. & BRCA1 & BRCA2161 
Myriad Genetics Inc. holds the United States’ patents for the hereditary breast 
cancer genes commonly referred to as BRCA1 and BRCA2.162  The discovery of 
BRCA1, the first gene to be identified as predisposing women to hereditary breast 
cancer, was made through international collaboration and the open exchange of 
information;163 however, Myriad alone holds the patent.164  As researchers got closer 
to isolating the gene, Myriad’s researchers, using work that had already been done, 
applied for the patent on the basis that they were the first to complete the sequencing 
of the gene (BRCA1).165  In addition, much of the work on BRCA2, for which 
Myriad also holds the patent, took place in Britain at the Sanger Centre in Cambridge 
and the Institute of Cancer Research (hereinafter ICR).166  Myriad filed its patent 
application for BRCA2 hours before ICR published its discovery in the journal 
Nature.167 
The BRCA1 and BRCA2 patents provide Myriad with exclusive rights to 
commercialize laboratory testing services, diagnostic test kits, and therapeutic 
products that use the BRCA1 and BRCA2 DNA sequences.168  Myriad can decide 
which labs will do the tests, how many tests will be done, and at what price.169  In the 
United States Myriad’s monopoly enables it to charge between $250-500 to screen 
for the occurrence of the mutation.170  For the full sequencing of both BRCA genes 
which would check for any mutation in either gene, Myriad charges about $2,400.171  
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In the United Kingdom, ICR holds the patent to BRCA2 and does not charge a 
licensing fee.172  Scientists at the Central Manchester Healthcare National Health 
Service Trust (hereinafter NHS) in the United Kingdom calculated that screening for 
a particular mutation known to occur in a patient’s family costs less than $140 in 
their own laboratories.173  Full sequencing of both BRCA genes would cost about 
$1,120.174  Because Myriad has applied for BRCA1 and BRCA2 patents in Europe, it 
is pressuring NHS to pay royalties on the patented gene(s) although NHS had 
developed its own tests for the breast cancer susceptibility genes.175  In Canada, 
before Myriad received its Canadian patent,176 the cost for full sequencing was 
around $1,200.177  In the U.S., where Myriad’s patents exist, the cost is nearly 
double.  Myriad will not have any competition in the U.S. for twenty years (the 
length of the patent) since the hereditary breast cancer gene is needed to do the 
screening and there is no way to invent around the gene.  This is an example of how 
a human gene patent can inflate the cost of healthcare. 
b.  Example 2: Canavan Disease 
In the fall of 1998, the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists 
announced its recommendation “that all Ashkenazi Jewish women should undergo 
DNA testing for Canavan carrier status.”178  Canavan disease is a genetic disorder 
that causes degeneration of the brain.179  Those doctors who fail to test for the disease 
face negligence liability if a patient has a child with the disease without being 
tested.180   
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A few weeks after the announcement, Miami Children’s Hospital began 
enforcing its 1997 patent for the Canavan gene.  The search for the Canavan gene at 
Miami Children's Hospital had been done at the insistence of, and with help from, 
parents who lost two children to Canavan.181  In 1993, hospital researchers 
discovered the gene and in 1997 they received the patent.182  The patent obtained by 
Miami’s Children’s Hospital was “for the gene and its related applications, including 
carrier and related testing.”183 
In October 2000, the same parents who helped initiate the research for the disease 
gene, along with the Canavan Foundation, Dor Yeshorim, and the National Tay-
Sachs and Allied Diseases Association, sued the researchers at Miami Children’s 
Hospital as well as the hospital.184  In their lawsuit, the plaintiffs did “not directly 
challenge the patent, but instead allege[d] that the researchers secretly obtained it 
using the genetic information and financial resources that had been donated for the 
public good and began charging royalties and limiting the availability of testing.”185 
The plaintiffs sought to block Miami Children’s Hospital commercial use of the 
Canavan gene and to recover damages derived from the collecting of royalties.186 
The parents claimed that the patent, and its strictly enforced licensing, has 
inhibited further research and closed down certain testing facilities.187  According to 
the complaint, the Canavan Foundation “was forced to stop offering free genetic 
screening … after being advised that it would have to pay royalties and comply with 
other licensing terms.”188  Dor Yeshorim may also stop offering the test because of 
the royalty fees.189  Prior to the patent enforcement by Miami Children's Hospital, the 
cost of the test had been between eight and nine dollars.190  Miami Children’s 
Hospital’s initial fee demand was twenty-five dollars; the hospital later decreased the 
fee to $12.50.  This increased fee had a huge impact on those who were offering the 
screening free of charge. The test is given to those who are considering having 
children and suspect that they are carriers of the disease.191  There are six million 
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Jews in America.192  Of those six million, 90% are Ashkenazi and one in forty is a 
silent carrier.193  These numbers indicate that it is very important that everyone be 
tested. 
Not only did Miami Children’s Hospital double the cost of the test, it also 
restricted the number of labs that could perform the test and the number of tests that 
could be done each year.194  The hospital defended this move on the grounds that it 
could get one large company to buy its exclusive license and recoup its costs, and the 
new owner could engage in widespread testing.195   
Researchers can influence how much profit gene patents generate.196  The 
patentees of the cystic fibrosis gene prohibited exclusive licensing and charge only 
two dollars a test.197  The same is true with Tay-Sachs disease, another genetic 
disease that affects Ashkenazi Jews.198  The reliance on benevolent researchers, 
however, is not a solution that can be counted on, especially since many patents are 
held by for-profit companies.  
2.  Multiplicity of Patents 
Science has moved away from thinking that one gene is responsible for each 
disease.  “[B]oth genome projects have affirmed what many scientists have been 
saying all along: the idea of a single function gene is a myth.”199  Likewise, scientists 
have abandoned their previously held belief that there is one gene for each protein.200  
In the Financial Times, Craig Vetner, president of Celera Genomics Inc., said, “[t]he 
notion that one gene equals one disease or that one gene produces one key protein is 
flying out the window.”201  Although there are some examples—Tay Sachs, 
Canavan, Huntington’s, Downs Syndrome, and sickle cell anemia—where a single 
gene is responsible for causing the disease, these are the minority.202  These single 
gene diseases were probably first discovered because it is easier to establish the link 
if there is only one gene involved.  Now, it is believed that for many diseases 
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multiple genes work in coordination; therefore, in order to treat or cure a disease, 
research and experimentation upon many genes and their functions is necessary.203   
The abandonment of the single gene disease theory has triggered a unique 
problem that could not have been contemplated when gene patents were first 
issued—a problem of multiplicity.  If more than one gene or gene failure is 
responsible for a single disease, in order to find which genes are linked to which 
diseases and to develop cures and treatments, researchers will need to be able to 
experiment with numerous genes.  The need to work with numerous genes means 
finding numerous patentees and paying numerous royalties and/or licensing fees.   
At this point in time the number of genes in the human genome is unknown.  
Scientists at the Human Genome Project and the Celera project have estimated that 
the number is between 30,000 and 40,000.204  With so few genes to work with and a 
patent system that does not encourage sharing information, new research is 
difficult.205  There is a possibility that most of the human genome is, or is about to 
become patented.  Over 1,000 human gene patents already exist and more than 
20,000 are pending.206  Researchers who are working on cutting edge medical 
science may have to go through ten to fifteen patent holders, negotiate licensing, and 
pay fees, in order to do their work.  Even some big drug companies are worried 
about these obstacles and oppose gene patenting.207  To develop a marketable end 
product, drug companies often use five to seven genes.208  The need to go through 
multiple patent holders generates numerous hurdles.  Patentees may refuse to deal 
with the researchers and entire projects could be halted.  The transaction costs of 
having to go through multiple patent holders make it more expensive to do research 
resulting in more expensive end products or impeding the development of new 
products altogether.  These costs will be passed down until they reach the 
consumer.209  The multiplicity of patents increases the cost to researchers and 
consumers beyond what was intended to be reasonable rewards for the patentees’ 
innovations. 
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Future progress and public health depend on researchers and clinicians having 
access to genetic information so discoveries can be made as quickly as possible.  
Multiple patent holders impede this progress. 
B.  The Inhibition of Research 
The PTO contends that gene patents do not stifle research stating that, “[t]he 
incentive to make discoveries and inventions is generally spurred, not inhibited, by 
patents.”210  Increasingly, scientists and policy-makers are challenging this position 
arguing that gene patents are not only increasing the cost of research, they are 
making it harder for researchers to get access to the latest information and, in some 
cases, stopping the research all together.   
[A]s more of the genetic code is mapped and deciphered, it’s frequently 
becoming more difficult-not easier-to conduct further research and gain 
more information.  With genetic patents staking private claims to huge 
chunks of the code, researchers and clinicians are finding their genetic 
research and diagnostic efforts thwarted by various restrictions imposed 
by commercial, and in some instances, academic, patent holders.211   
The necessity of being the first to apply for the patent in order to obtain the 
patent has caused some researchers to keep valuable information from one another.  
Professor Jonathan King of the Massachusetts Institute for Technology has said: 
“[p]atent attorneys regularly advise researchers to restrict their presentations to 
colleagues, don’t show your work, don’t show your notebook, don’t give that talk, so 
as not to jeopardize the planned patent submissions. This has reversed the half 
century culture of free and open communication in the scientific communities.” 212  A 
survey of biotechnology firms done in the mid-1990’s supports Professor King’s 
statement.213  The survey found that concerns about the effect that patents had on the 
free flow of knowledge between researchers might be justified:  “[a]mong surveyed 
firms having research relations with academic institutions, 82% sometimes required 
researchers ‘to keep information confidential until the filing of a patent application’ 
and 47% ‘occasionally required’ confidentiality beyond the time required to file a 
patent.”214  The information that was withheld included experimental methods, future 
experimental plans, and gene products, sequences, and locations.215  The 
disincentives to sharing information slows an already painstakingly long process of 
finding genes and their functions, which in turn retards medical progress. 
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Gene patents have also been responsible for shutting down laboratories working 
at the forefront of genetics.  In 1999, survey results indicated that one in four 
laboratories stopped performing certain genetic tests because they received 
notifications of patent restrictions or because of high licensing fees.216  Debra 
Leonard, director of the Molecular Pathology program at the University of 
Pennsylvania Health System, is accustomed to cease-and-desist orders against her 
laboratory.217  The cease-and-desist orders prevent Leonard from conducting tests 
she’s developed for a neurodegenerative condition of the cerebellum, hereditary 
hemochromatosis, cystic fibrosis delta f508, and for Canavan’s disease.218  Another 
lab at Penn that tests for BRCA1 has also been ordered to stop.219  This is “[b]ecause 
other entities have patented the genes that carry these diseases, and they’ve adopted 
restrictive licensure agreements permitting one, or at most a few laboratories to do 
all testing involving these genes.”220  Jon F. Merz, an assistant professor of bioethics 
at the University of Pennsylvania, has preliminary survey results showing that of 
about 100 laboratories researching hemochromatosis, 20% did not develop a test in 
part because the gene is patented.221  The labs closed because they did not want to 
spend the valuable research time and money knowing that there was a chance they 
would be shut down by patent holders.222   
Exclusive licensing of patents can inhibit the progress of science because only a 
limited number of researchers are using and testing the new information.223  
Licensing, while not as prohibitive as exclusive licensing, can still retard new 
information and technologies when it is cost prohibitive.224  Patent holders can refuse 
to grant researchers licenses altogether, and when researchers are given the 
opportunity to purchase licenses, the patent holders set the terms usually charging 
“both an upfront usage fee and a per test fee, often at rates that small diagnostic 
laboratories cannot afford.”225  Therefore, even if licensing is available, unreasonably 
high fees can lead researchers to shut down their labs.226  Lab shut downs, like the 
inability to gain access to the latest information, can result in a discovery taking 
longer or not being made at all.  
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One pharmaceutical firm, Merck & Co., has made the Merck Gene index free to 
the public.227  The Merck Gene index is a gene library.228  Keith Elliston, associate 
director of Merck's department of bioinformatics, is quoted as saying that this kind of 
gene sequence data should be openly accessed because “it increases the probability 
of breakthrough discoveries.”229  There is a question whether Merck’s release of the 
information to the public will counteract the problems that are seen with gene 
patents.  It may be that if researchers use Merck's sequences and those sequences are 
covered by previously filed patent applications, the scientists might be prevented 
from using the Merck sequences for research without paying fees to the patent 
holders.230  The availability of some public databases like Merck's does not 
necessarily reduce the inhibition of research.  The private databases are still more 
valuable because they use both information that was gathered privately and whatever 
information the public databases hold.231 
C.  Decreased Quality of Healthcare 
Oftentimes when a gene is associated with a particular disease, scientists work to 
develop a test that allows them to determine if an individual has the affected gene.  
Labs spend years developing and validating tests for disease genes.232  They train 
physicians, who will implement the tests in their practices, on how to administer the 
tests, and how to evaluate the results. 233  Ultimately, the tests become “the standard 
of medical practice.”234  With the availability of gene patents, some companies, 
hospitals, and universities are patenting genes and the tests they have developed.  
The patent holders then authorize a limited number of labs to perform the tests.  Labs 
that have been testing all along without licenses must cease testing and they are also 
prohibited from answering questions that physicians may have about the tests 
because they are not permitted to use the gene, even if they have their own tests.235  
This was the case in the Canavan example.236 
Exclusive licensing raises questions about the quality of testing and research.237  
If only one or two labs are licensed to perform certain tests, there is never a chance 
to do an objective quality control comparison with other researchers at different 
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labs.238  Also, second opinions can be difficult to obtain when only a few labs test for 
certain traits.239   
Another impact of the exclusive licensing is the effect on physicians.  Physicians 
are the ones who will be interpreting the results of these tests.  “The way physicians 
learn how to use tests is to actually see tests and do tests and interpret them and study 
them,” said Jonathan F. Tait, MD, PhD, associate professor and director of the 
Molecular Diagnosis Laboratory at the University of Washington, Seattle.240  If all 
the tests go to one lab, the ability to participate and learn from the tests is nearly 
impossible, and in the end the patient suffers because the care is sub-optimal.  
Disease gene patents prevent clinicians from practicing the best medicine.241 
D.  The Impact of the PTO’s Current Utility Standards   
In February 2000, the PTO issued a patent to Human Genome Sciences 
(hereinafter HGS)242 for the gene CCR5.243  HGS was issued a patent on the CCR5 
gene, its protein, and fragments of DNA for locating the gene.244  The utility that 
HGS described for CCR5 was that CCR5 was a receptor gene that binds protein 
molecules termed “chemokines.”245  HGS’s patent application claimed that the 
chemokines would be useful for treatments involving inflammation, immune 
reactions, allergies, and arthritis.246  The patent application did not disclose the 
function of CCR5’s particular protein product, although the patent on it was given to 
HGS.247  The function of the CCR5 protein was later discovered by independent 
researchers at the NIH.248  The NIH research showed that the CCR5 protein works as 
a co-receptor in binding HIV.249  It is likely that this protein is necessary for the HIV 
virus to be transmitted from one person to another.250  Independent researchers also 
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discovered that the defective versions of CCR5 suppress HIV infection by preventing 
the virus from attaching to cells.251   
Despite the fact that HGS was not the one to discover the medically valuable 
information about the CCR5 gene, and did no research to demonstrate its role in HIV 
infection, they were still awarded the patent.252  HGS acknowledges that when they 
applied for the patent they had no knowledge of the gene’s role in HIV infection.253  
The patent allows HGS to determine who can use the gene to develop new AIDS 
drugs.254  This could nullify any research done by the teams that actually found the 
gene’s real use.255  The overall effect is that HGS can now exclude anyone, including 
the NIH group, from using the gene in HIV treatment.256  Although HGS is making 
the gene available to academic researchers at no cost, the developer of any 
commercial product will owe them royalties.257   
The PTO issued new utility guidelines in 2001 “with the intent of tightening the 
standard and restricting the issuance of gene patents.”258  However, the NIH contends 
that the new utility standards issued by the PTO do not do enough to prevent a 
reoccurrence of the CCR5 situation.259  The HGS patent on the CCR5 gene illustrates 
two of the main problems that can still occur under the Patent and Trademark 
Office’s current utility criteria.   
First, under the new guidelines only one utility has to be described.  That utility 
does not have to be the most medically relevant utility, and that one utility does not 
even have to be for the gene and its corresponding products.  The PTO openly 
acknowledges that one function, and not necessarily the best or most useful function, 
will meet the criteria for patentability.260  The requirement that only one utility needs 
to be described in order to gain a patent on all of a gene’s functions makes the 
patents extremely broad.261  The PTO is not opposed to broad genetic patents and has 
stated that,  
A patent on a composition gives exclusive rights to the composition for a 
limited time, even if the inventor disclosed only a single use for the 
composition.  Thus, a patent granted on an isolated and purified DNA 
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composition confers the right to exclude others from any method of using 
that DNA composition, for up to twenty years from the filing date.  This 
result flows from the language of the statute.”262   
If a subsequent researcher finds a new use for the patented DNA or gene, a 
process patent can be issued; however, the holder of the process patent may still owe 
the original patent holder royalty or licensing fees.263  The PTO posits that broad 
patents encourage subsequent discoveries and promote progress and are one of the 
ways in which the patentee can recoup costs.264  Although it is likely that broad 
patents enable patent holders to recoup costs, these patents do not encourage 
discoveries nor do they promote progress.  Although HGS is allowing researchers to 
use the CCR5 gene free of charge, this is not required by patent law.  Rather, an 
original patent holder has the ability to exclusively license and to set royalty fees at 
any rate. 
The second problem that arises from the current utility criteria is that the utility 
can be speculative in nature.  HGS determined that CCR5 would be useful as a 
chemokine receptor by using homology studies.265  Homology studies determine 
gene function by comparing the human gene sequence to gene sequences of other 
species whose functions are already known.266  If there is enough homology between 
the two gene sequences, then it is assumed that the genes function in the same way.  
The PTO accepts homology-based assertions of utility, although some scientists 
believe that homology studies are unpredictable.267  Many groups, such as Celera and 
HGP, believe that a patent should not be given on a particular DNA sequence until 
the applicant is able to clearly describe the gene's role.268  Utilities based on 
homology can be incorrect and can prevent the most medically valuable function of a 
gene from being discovered.  CCR5 is an example where one research team 
discovered a “function” based on a homology and then another publicly-funded team 
discovered a true medically valuable function of the gene.  DNA sequences that are 
patented through homology patents could have “multiple unexplored functions.”269  
These other functions are likely to remain unexplored because homology utilities can 
be found very quickly. 
The fact that one utility description is enough to get a patent that covers all of a 
gene’s functions is detrimental to finding the best use for a gene which ultimately 
effects the quality of public healthcare.  Homology studies also decrease the quality 
of healthcare by encouraging the quick patenting of genes without any demonstration 
                                                                
262Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. at 1095. 
263Doll, supra note 20, at 690. 
264Id. 
265The Fate of Gene Patents Under the New Utility Guidelines, supra note 33, at ¶ 6. 
266Gene Patenting, supra note 10, at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/ 
2314.html. 
267Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. at 1096. 
268Gitter supra note 13, at 1631. 
269Albright, supra note 138, at http://www.gene-watch.org/genewatch/articles/14-3human 
genome.html.  
27Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2002
280 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:253 
of the benefits to the public, and by restricting researchers, who could develop 
socially beneficial products, from having access to the genes.270 
VI.  AN APPROACH TO BALANCING THE INTERESTS 
Since the Patent Act of 1952, the patent laws of the United States have remained 
relatively unchanged.271  The few revisions that have been made were primarily “to 
correct minor technical issues and to make the patent laws of the United States 
consistent with various international treaty obligations.”272  In order for the current 
problems of gene patenting to be addressed, Congress needs to amend the patent 
laws. 
The PTO is without authority to make the fundamental changes that are needed to 
address the issues that gene patents raise.  The role of the PTO is to interpret and 
implement the federal statutes and guidelines.273  Likewise, the courts are not the 
source of change in this area.  First of all, patent suits concern infringement issues 
not public policy, and the cost of going to court over a patent is extremely 
expensive.274  Second, in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, the Supreme Court recognized 
that it was not competent to hear arguments on the hazards of genetic research and 
that the legislative and executive branches of government were the appropriate 
audiences.275  
There is precedent for Congress to change patent law when public health is at 
stake.  In 1996, Congress passed a law protecting physicians and institutions from 
liability for infringing on patents that covered medical process such as surgical 
incisions.276  This law was passed in response to the medical community’s concern 
that the patents on medical procedures would decrease the quality of patient care 
because the newest techniques could not be used without the threat of a potential 
patent infringement lawsuit.277  The legislation does not eliminate patent 
protection.278  Rather, it exempts certain medical practitioners from patent 
infringement claims.279 
Congress should adopt the American Medical Association’s (hereinafter AMA) 
policy on gene patents.  The AMA’s policy reads: 
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AMA policy on gene patents is: (1) Patents on processes—for example, 
processes used to isolate and purify gene sequences, genes and proteins, 
or vehicles of gene therapy—do not raise the same ethical problems as 
patents as the substances themselves and are thus preferable. (2) 
Substance patents on purified proteins presents fewer ethical problems 
than patents on genes or DNA sequences and are thus preferable.  (3) The 
AMA: (a) supports the concepts of gene patents only if the inventor has 
demonstrated a practical, real world, specific and substantial use (credible 
utility) for the sequence; (b) supports equitable access to licenses and 
sublicenses of gene patents for diagnostic genetic tests to any Clinical 
Laboratory Improvement Act (CLIA)-certified laboratory at a reasonable 
royalty (c) supports the concept of gene patents only if the inventor has 
demonstrated a practical use beyond merely being a tool for scientific 
discovery, (d) recommends that the Department of Health and Human 
Services (DHHS) Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Genetic Testing 
consider the development of special guidelines for the licensing of human 
gene-related patents as a way of promoting research and other benefits; (e) 
encourages the DHHS as part of its regulatory oversight of genetic testing 
to continue to monitor the impact of gene patenting and licensing 
agreements on access to relevant medical care; and (f) encourages the 
DHHS Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Genetic Testing to further 
discuss what “credible utility” should refer to within the fields of 
biotechnology.  (4) One of the goals of genetic research is to achieve 
better medical treatments and technologies.  Granting patent protection 
should not hinder this goal.  Individuals or entities holding patents on 
genetic material should not allow patents to languish and should negotiate 
and structure licensing agreements in such a way as to encourage the 
development of better medical technology.280 
The AMA’s policy adequately addresses the major problems that result from gene 
patents.  Although the patentee will still hold the patent for twenty years, under the 
AMA policy the monopoly given will resemble the kind of monopoly that was 
intended to exist.  In section 3(b), the AMA supports access to gene patents by all 
certified laboratories at a reasonable cost.  By requiring that licensing come at a 
reasonable cost, laboratories will be able to continue their research, which means the 
public will benefit from the results sooner.  The reasonable cost to the lab can be 
passed on to the consumer.  In addition to advocating reasonable costs, Section 3(b) 
prohibits exclusive licensing of gene patents.  This will end the problems of 
decreased quality and lab shut downs that exist with exclusive licensing. 
Section 3(b) also addresses the problems that occur with the multiplicity of 
patents.  Laboratories seeking to use patented genes will still have to locate the 
patent holders, but this effort will not be in vain because access will be guaranteed 
for a reasonable royalty.  While section 3(a) accepts the PTO’s revised utility 
standards, section 3(f) encourages the Department of Health and Human Services 
(DHHS) to further examine what “credible utility” should mean in the area of 
biotechnology.  Further examination into defining utility may lead policy-makers to 
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prohibit infringement actions against people who use patented genes to develop more 
medically useful utilities.  Section 3(e) encourages the DHHS to monitor the impact 
of gene patents on medical care.  This is extremely important since there are 
divergent views on the topic and little empirical evidence.  The DHHS is in a better 
position than the PTO to investigate the impact of patents on healthcare because it 
can enlist the NIH and other groups to help develop a well conceived study.   
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Gene patents are needed as an incentive for biotech companies to develop 
products for consumers.281 However, under the current patent law, biomedical 
research is inhibited and the public is paying twice for biotech innovation.  In order 
to protect public health, Congress must amend the patent law.  The best existing 
model for legislative change has been proposed by the American Medical 
Association.  The AMA model addresses all of the public policy concerns, but still 
allows biotech companies to hold gene patents. 
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